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Abstract: This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single
defendant and N plaintiffs when there are fixed costs of litigation. When
making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the plaintiffs, the defendant
adopts a divide and conquer strategy. Plaintiffs settle their claims for less
than they are jointly worth. The problem is worse when N is larger, the
offers are sequential, and the plaintiffs make offers instead. Although divide
and conquer strategies dilute the defendant’s incentives, they increase the
settlement rate and reduce litigation spending. Plaintiffs can raise their
joint payoff through transfer payments, voting rules, and covenants not to
accept discriminatory offers.(JEL: K4, C7, D8)
Keywords: litigation, settlement, class actions, bargaining, divide and con-
quer, contracting with externalities
1 Introduction
This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single defendant and N plaintiffs
when there are economies of scale in litigation. In particular, litigation is assumed to
involve fixed costs that will be spread among the plaintiffs who go to trial. Consequently,
the decision of one plaintiff to settle out of court imposes a negative externality on the
remaining plaintiffs. The defendant can easily exploit the plaintiffs in this environment,
coercing the plaintiffs to settle for far less than their claims are jointly worth. This is
robust to the timing of offers and the structure of information.1
∗The authors thank discussants Jennifer Reinganum and Alexander Stremitzer, and many conference
participants for helpful comments and lively discussion. Kathryn Spier acknowledges the financial
support from the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at the Harvard Law School.
1But see the accompanying discussion of Stremitzer [forthcoming].
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We begin by considering the case of symmetric information and identical plaintiffs.
The defendant has all of the bargaining power, making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it
offers to the plaintiffs before trial. The unique coalition proof Nash equilibrium involves
a divide and conquer strategy (Segal [2003]) where the defendant discriminates among
the otherwise identical plaintiffs, making generous offers to some plaintiffs and offering
less to others. When the number of plaintiffs is large, the externalities are more severe
and a significant fraction of the plaintiffs receive nothing at all in equilibrium. The
plaintiffs would be better off in aggregate if they coordinated their actions and made
jointly optimal settlement decisions. Coordination may be achieved through a variety of
mechanisms. First, the plaintiffs could raise their joint payoffs by committing ex ante to
a single acceptance decision (i.e. through a unanimous voting rule). Second, the plain-
tiffs could achieve higher payoffs through a commitment not to accept discriminatory
offers. Finally, the exchange of side payments would allow the plaintiffs to overcome
the externalities and achieve a jointly optimal outcome. These mechanisms raise the
plaintiffs’ aggregate recovery and provide greater incentives to the defendant to take
precautions to avoid accidents.2
Next, we suppose that the defendant approaches the plaintiffs in a predetermined
order, making sequential take-it-or-leave-it offers to each. Interestingly, the plaintiffs
may be even worse off in this scenario. When the economies of scale in litigation are
sufficiently strong (or, equivalently, the number of plaintiffs sufficiently large) then the
plaintiffs each receive a zero payoff. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the plaintiffs are
no better off when they have the power to make take-or-leave-it offers to the defendant
instead. To see why this is true, imagine that the economies of scale are sufficiently
strong that a single plaintiff would never find it profitable to pursue an individual claim.
The defendant can exploit the situation, accepting just N − 1 of the offers, thereby
inducing the Nth plaintiff to drop his claim. This creates a “race to the bottom” where
plaintiffs make negligible settlement demands to avoid being left out of the deal.
Additional insights emerge when the plaintiffs have private information about their
damages. To simplify the analysis, we restrict our attention to the case of just two
plaintiffs with independently distributed damages. We first establish a benchmark where
the two plaintiffs can observe each others’ types and make transfer payments to each
other. There are no coordination failures between the plaintiffs in this benchmark,
although trials do occur in equilibrium as a result of the private information. When
neither plaintiff can observe the other plaintiff’s type and transfers are impossible, we
show that the defendant adopts a divide and conquer strategy, making a more attractive
offer to one plaintiff than the other. The defendant’s aggregate payments are lower than
in the case where the plaintiffs could coordinate their actions. Moreover, trials are less
2Increased incentives may or may not raise social welfare, depending on whether the defendant was
overdeterred or underdeterred to begin with. See Polinsky and Rubinfeld [1988] on the deterrence
effects of settlement and Shavell [1997] for a good discussion of the social value of litigation.
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likely to occur than in the benchmark case. This implies a social welfare benefit that
would counterbalance to some extent any welfare loss from reduced deterrence.
Our paper is part of the broader literature on contracting with externalities (Segal
[1999]; Segal and Whinston [2000]). This literature studies the nature and efficiency
of bilateral contracting when bilateral trade generates multilateral externalities. As
described in Segal [2003], divide and conquer strategies naturally arise in applications
such as corporate takeovers (Grossman and Hart [1988]), competition among internet
service providers (Caillaud and Jullien [2003]), and exclusive contracts (Innes and
Sexton [1994]; Segal and Whinston [2000]).3 In the exclusive contracting setting,
for example, divide and conquer strategies are socially undesirable because they can
deter the entry of a more efficient supplier. In our setting, divide and conquer strategies
have the social benefit of raising the settlement rate and reducing litigation costs in the
presence of asymmetric information.
There is also a large literature on the settlement of litigation.4 While much of this
literature focuses on situations involving a single plaintiff and a single defendant, others
have explored strategic issues that arise when there are multiple interested parties.5
Take, for example, the situation where several defendants are implicated in a single
plaintiff’s damages. Under joint and several liability, a single losing defendant can be
held personally responsible for the entire level of the plaintiff’s damages. Kornhauser
and Revesz [1994a, 1994b] show that the settlement externalties hinge on both the legal
treatment of prior settlements and on the degree of correlation between the defendant’s
cases.6 Spier [2002] considers the related problem of a single defendant negotiating
with several plaintiffs when the defendant’s wealth is insufficient to cover the damages
should all plaintiffs win at trial. Che and Yi [1993] consider the incentives of a single
defendant to settle sequential suits when the judgments in early cases will bind on future
cases. Other papers that explore information externalities in sequential litigation include
Daughety and Reinganum [1999, 2002] and Hua and Spier [2005].7
Several other papers in the law and economics literature have explored the incentives
to plaintiffs to consolidate their claims into class actions for the purpose of litigation
3See also Rasmusen et. al. [1991].
4Surveys of this literature include Cooter and Rubinfeld [1989], Hay and Spier [1998], Daugh-
ety [2000], and Spier [2007].
5See also the survey of Daughety and Reinganum [2005] that focuses on multiparty litigation.
6Subsequent work includes Spier [1994], Klerman [1996], and Chang and Sigman [2000]. Recent
work by Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar [2007] describes strategic interdependencies among defendants
in a criminal context when the prosecutor has a limited budget.
7Spier [2003a, 2003b] and Daughety and Reinganum [2004] show how a defendant can use
most-favored-nations clauses to create artifical externalities among claims, thereby achieving improved
settlement outcomes. Meurer [1992] and Sykes [1994] consider the conflicts and externalities between
defendants and their liability insurers. Spier and Sykes [1998] consider the conflicts between debtholders
and the equity in litigation. Choi [2003] and Bebchuk and Guzman [1996] consider externalities
between plaintiffs and their attorneys.
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and/or settlement. Che [1996] assumes that there are cost economies of consolidation,
and that the plaintiffs who join a class will forgo fine-tuned awards and receive instead
the average damage of the group. Che aruged that plaintiffs with weak cases are more
likely to join a class, since they would prefer to receive the average damage award, while
plaintiffs with strong cases would opt out. The adverse selection problem is mitigated,
however, when plaintiffs are privately informed. Weak plaintiffs have an incentive to
remain independent, too, in an attempt to “signal” that they have strong cases and, in
equilibrium, fewer weak plaintiffs join the class. Che [2002] argues that classes may form
to increase the members’ bargaining power via information aggregation. The defendant
is more generous when bargaining with the class as a whole than when bargaining with
individuals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and character-
izes an important benchmark. Section 3 characterizes the divide and conquer equilibrium
when the defendant makes simultaneous offers to the plaintiffs, and discusses implica-
tions for class formation and incentives for care. Section 4 extends the basic model
to sequential settlement offers, plaintiff bargaining power, and asymmetric information.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
N identical plaintiffs are suing a common defendant. The plaintiffs’ aggregate damages
are D. At trial, an individual plaintiff will receive an award equal to his share of the
total damages,
x(N) =
D
N
.
This is the plaintiff’s award regardless of how many other plaintiffs have settled their
claims out of court.8 In contrast, a plaintiff’s litigation cost will depend critically on how
many other plaintiffs have settled (or dropped) their claims. Specifically, the aggregate
litigation costs for the plaintiff and the defendant, Cp and Cd, are assumed to be fixed.
If n ≤ N plaintiffs go to trial, the litigating plaintiffs will split the fixed costs evenly,
each plaintiff bearing
cp(n) =
Cp
n
.
The per-capita net recovery for a plaintiff when litigating with a group of size n is
therefore given by
x(N)− cp(n) = D
N
− Cp
n
.
8In practice, the plaintiffs’ aggregate recovery (and the defendant’s corresponding liability) would
often increase with the number of plaintiffs. See the accompanying discussion of Reinganum [forth-
coming]. We adopt this normalization in order to isolate how the settlement externalities depend on
the number of plaintiffs without changing the magnitude of the stakes.
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Note that a plaintiff’s net recovery at trial is decreasing in N , the total number of
plaintiffs, but increasing in n, the number of plaintiffs who actually go to trial. We will
maintain the assumption throughout the paper that D − Cp > 0. This implies that if
all N plaintiffs went to trial then each individual plaintiff would receive a positive net
return, x(N)− cp(N) > 0.
A plaintiff’s net return from going to trial alone will be positive if N is small but
negative if N is large. It is easy to see why this is true. Suppose that N = 1. This
one plaintiff would surely derive positive value from litigating alone: x(1) − cp(1) =
D − Cp > 0. When N = 2, however, the plaintiff’s return from litigating alone is
x(2) − cp(1) = D/2 − Cp. He only receives half of the damages but bears the entire
fixed cost. When N = 3, a plaintiff’s return from litigating alone falls even further,
x(3)− cp(1) = D/3−Cp. The plaintiff’s return from trial alone is clearly negative when
N is sufficiently large, for D/N − Cp → −Cp < 0 as N →∞. Let N∗ be defined as
N∗ := sup{N | x(N)− cp(1) ≥ 0}.
In other words, N∗ is the largest integer where even a single plaintiff can achieve a
positive net return at trial.
Next, we define m(N) to be the smallest group size where plaintiffs in this group
would enjoy a positive return if all m(N) members of the group went to trial. That is,
m(N) := inf{n| x(N)− cp(n) ≥ 0}
or, equivalently
m(N) := inf
{
n
∣∣∣ n
N
≥ Cp
D
}
.
For a strategic purpose, m(N) represents the minimal group size who can pose a credible
threat to the defendant. Notice that m(N) is weakly increasing in N . When N ≤ N∗,
m(N) = 1, so even a single plaintiff has a positive expected value claim. If N > N∗,
then m(N) > 1. When N increases in this range, a weakly larger group size m(N) is
required to make litigation jointly profitable for the plaintiffs. If we take the limit as N
approaches infinity we find that m(N)/N converges to exactly Cp/D.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the defendant makes offers
to each of the N plaintiffs, S = {S1, ..., SN}. These offers are publicly observed. With-
out loss of generality, we will also assume that these offer are nondecreasing in i. In
the second stage, the plaintiffs decide simultaneously and non-cooperatively whether to
accept or reject their respective offers. Plaintiffs who accept offers immediately receive
payment and exit the game. In the third stage, any remaining plaintiffs must decide si-
multaneously and non-cooperatively whether to drop their cases or proceed to trial. The
trials take place in stage four. Our equilibrium concept throughout the paper is subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in coalition-proof strategies. More specifically, our equilibrium
requires the strategies to form a Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium for each subset
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of plaintiffs — namely for there to be no other strategies that provide strictly higher pay-
offs for any group of plaintiffs — in every subgame. This refinement, due to Bernheim,
Peleg, and Whinston [1987], is employed here to ensure that the exploitation of the
externalities does not simply stem from equilibrium selection or simple coordination fail-
ure on the part of the plaintiffs. While the plaintiffs are allowed to make coalition-proof
acceptance decisions, we do not allow for explicit negotiation among plaintiffs with side
payments. We shall later draw an implication of such negotiation abilities.
Before proceeding, it is useful to consider a benchmark in which the externalities
facing the plaintiffs are fully internalized. This can be done for instance if the plaintiffs
are represented by a benevolent agent who makes acceptance decisions for the plaintiffs
in the joint best interest. The following observation is immediate.
Proposition 1. (Benchmark) If the plaintiffs make a jointly optimal decision, then
the defendant’s total payment or, equivalently, the plaintiffs’ aggregate recovery, is L∗(N) =∑N
i=1 Si = D − Cp.
3 Analysis
3.1 Equilibrium Characterization
This section characterizes the unique coalition-proof equilibrium of the game. In particu-
lar, we show that the defendant adopts a divide and conquer strategy that discriminates
among the different plaintiffs. Some plaintiffs receive very generous settlement offers
while other plaintiffs receive much less. Indeed, when the number of plaintiffs N is large
then a sizable fraction of the plaintiffs will receive nothing at all.
For the purpose of illustration, suppose that N = 2 and that x(2)− cp(1) = D/2−
Cp > 0. Each plaintiff has a credible unilateral threat to take the defendant to trial in
this case. If the plaintiffs make jointly optimal decisions as in the previous benchmark,
the defendant could do no better than offer S1 = S2 = D/2−Cp/2 to each plaintiff (plus
a penny perhaps). The plaintiffs are weakly better off accepting these offers than going
to trial, and the defendant pays a total of S1 + S2 = D − Cp in settlement.
The defendant does strictly better when the plaintiffs make decentralized decisions,
however. To see why, suppose that the defendant offers S2 = D/2−Cp/2 to the second
plaintiff but makes a much less generous offer to the first plaintiff, S1 = D/2 − Cp. It
is a dominant strategy for the second plaintiff to accept his relatively generous offer.
Knowing this, the first plaintiff would accept the less generous offer. The defendant
pays strictly less to the plaintiffs through this divide and conquer strategy: S1 + S2 =
D− 3Cp/2. The defendant is, essentially, taking advantage of the plaintiffs’ inability to
internalize the settlement externalities.
The next proposition states the general result.
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Proposition 2. There is a unique coalition-proof equilibrium of the game. The defen-
dant offers S = {S1, ..., SN} where Si = max{0, x(N) − cp(i)}, and these offers are all
accepted by the plaintiffs.
Proof: We can show that if the defendant offers Si to plaintiff i = 1, ..., N , then
it is a coalition-proof equilibrium for the plaintiffs to all accept the offers. To see this,
take an arbitrary coalition Ik ⊂ {1, ..., N} with |Ik| = k ≥ 1. If all members of coalition
Ik rejected their offers, then each member of the coalition would receive max{0, x(N)−
cp(k)}. Since Si is nondecreasing in i by construction, we must have
max
i∈Ik
Si ≥ Sk = max{0, x(N)− cp(k)}.
This implies that some member of coalition Ik must receive a settlement offer of at
least max{0, x(N)− cp(k)}. This is the amount that member would get if the coalition
rejected their settlement offers and went to trial. This member is clearly weakly better
off accepting the settlement offer. Therefore it is a coalition proof equilibrium for all
plaintiffs to accept their respective offers.
Next, we show that S = {S1, ..., SN}, where Si = max{0, x(N) − cp(i)} is the best
sequence of offers that the defendant can make, given the coalition-proof refinement.
Observe first that with S, the defendant is paying strictly less to any coalition of plaintiffs
than she would pay in total if she were to take that coalition to trial. This follows from
the fact that Si < x(N) for all i while at trial the defendant would pay on average more
than x(N) to for each plaintiff. Hence, it suffices to show that S is the lowest set of
offers that she can make that will be accepted in any coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
To prove this, consider any set of offers S˜ := {S˜1, ..., S˜N} listed in the ascending order.
Suppose S˜k < Sk = max{0, x(N) − cp(k)}. Since the offers are in ascending order, we
have
S˜i < Sk = max{0, x(N)− cp(k)} for each i = 1, ..., k,
Hence, in a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, a coalition of plaintiffs i = 1, ...k will not
accept the offers S˜. This proves that for S˜ to be accepted by the plaintiffs in a coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium, we must have S˜k ≥ Sk for each k = 1, ..., N , which proves that
S is the optimal offer for the defendant.
3.2 Equilibrium Payoffs
We now characterize the plaintiffs’ payoffs and the defendant’s loss in equilibrium, which
will yield a useful implication later for ex ante deterrence. It follows from the equilib-
rium characterization that the defendant’s total payments or, equivalently, the plaintiffs’
aggregate recovery, is given by
L(N) =
N∑
i=1
max{0, x(N)− cp(i)}.
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It is of particular interest to see how this function varies with the total number of
plaintiffs. Since the upper bound for the loss, L∗(N) = D − Cp, is independent of N
(because of our normalization), this function L(·) will reveal whether the problem of
externalities worsen or improve as a function of N .
Recall that N∗ is defined to be the largest number of plaintiffs where even a single
plaintiff has a positive expected value claim. When N ≤ N∗ then the first settlement
offer in the set S is positive, or S1 = x(N) − cp(1) > 0. It follows that all of the
settlement offers are strictly positive: Si = D/N − Cp/i, i = 1, ...N . The defendant’s
total settlement payments in this case may be written:
L(N) = D −
N∑
i=1
Cp
i
.
The sum
∑N
i=1(1/i) is a called a “harmonic number” orHN . HN is an increasing function
and diverges slowly as N approaches infinity. Hence, the function L(N) is decreasing in
the number of plaintiffs, N .
Now suppose instead that N > N∗. In this case, the equilibrium sequence of offers
is characterized by Si = 0 for i = 0, ...,m(N)− 1 and Si = x(N)− cp(N) = D/N −Cp/i
for i = m(N), ...N . The defendant’s total settlement payments as a function of N are:
L(N) = [N −m(N) + 1]D
N
−
N∑
i=m(N)
Cp
i
L(N) is decreasing in this range as well.
Proposition 3. The defendant’s total payment, L(N), is a decreasing function of N .
Furthermore, L(1) = D−Cp and, in the limit as N approaches infinity, L(N) converges
to D − Cp + Cp ln(Cp/D) > 0.
Proof: We will first show that L(N), is a decreasing function of N . The case of
N ≤ N∗ has already been proven. We will therefore focus on the second case where
N > N∗. In this case, we can rewrite
L(N) = D − [m(N)− 1]D
N
− Cp
N∑
i=m(N)
1
i
,
where
m(N) =
⌈
NCp
D
⌉
(where d·e means the smallest integer no less than (·).) We are interested in signing
L(N + 1)− L(N). To this end, observe first
m(N + 1) =
⌈
NCp
D
+
Cp
D
⌉
≤ m(N) + 1,
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since Cp < D. In other words, either m(N + 1) = m(N) or m(N + 1) = m(N) + 1. We
consider each of the two cases in turn. Suppose first m(N + 1) = m(N). Then,
L(N + 1)− L(N) = [m(N)− 1]
(
D
N
)
− [m(N)− 1]
(
D
N + 1
)
− Cp
N + 1
=
[
m(N)− 1
N + 1
] [
D
N
− Cp
m(N)− 1
]
≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from the definition of m(N).
Suppose next m(N + 1) = m(N) + 1. Then,
L(N + 1)− L(N) = [m(N)− 1]
(
D
N
)
−m(N)
(
D
N + 1
)
− Cp
N + 1
+
Cp
m(N)
=
[
m(N)
N + 1
] [
D
N
− Cp
m(N)
]
− D
N
+
Cp
m(N)
=
[
m(N)− (N + 1)
N + 1
] [
D
N
− Cp
m(N)
]
≤ 0,
where the inequality holds since D/N − Cp/m(N) ≥ 0 and since m(N) < N + 1.
Next, we will establish the limit as N approaches infinity. Rewrite the defendant’s
total payments as:
L(N) = D −D
[
m(N) + 1
N
]
− Cp
N∑
i=1
1
i
+ Cp
m(N)−1∑
i=1
1
i
.
or
L(N) = D −D
[
m(N) + 1
N
]
− CpHN + CpHm(N)−1.
We will now take the limit as N approaches infinity. The harmonic number HN has
the property that lim[HN − ln(N)] = γ where γ is the Euler constant 0.57721.... We
therefore have
limL(N) = D −D lim
[
m(N) + 1
N
]
+ Cp lim[ln[m(N)− 1]− ln(N)]
or
limL(N) = D −D lim
[
m(N) + 1
N
]
+ Cp lim ln
[
m(N)− 1
N
]
.
In the limit we have
m(N)− 1
N
=
Cp
D
.
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So we have
limL(N) = D − Cp + Cp ln Cp
D
.
It is straightforward to show that this is positive for all Cp < D. Let x = Cp/D. By
our earlier assumptions, we know that x ∈ (0, 1). To show that limL(N) is positive, it
is sufficient to show that f(x) = 1− x+ x lnx > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1). We know that this
is true because f(1) = 0 and f ′(x) = ln(x) < 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1).
3.3 Implications and Discussion
The previous section showed that plaintiffs are jointly exploited by the defendant through
settlement. The negative externality associated with individual settlement decisions
leads the plaintiffs to settle their claims for too little overall. In aggregate, the plaintiffs
receive less than D − Cp, what they would receive if they all went to trial. Moreover,
their joint payoff is falling in the number of plaintiffs. These results have important im-
plications for both the incentives of the defendant to take precautions to avoid accidents
to begin with, and the incentives of plaintiffs to organize themselves into classes.
Importantly, the presence of multiple plaintiffs reduces the incentives of the defendant
to take care. This follows immediately from the fact that L(N) < D − Cp whenever
N > 1. This is an important result. Although the defendant is exploiting plaintiffs
through settlement ex post, there are no ex post welfare implications of this exploitation.
The exploitation leads to a simple redistribution of value away from the plaintiffs and
towards the defendant. When ex ante behavior is taken into account, however, then we
find that the bargaining outcome is relevant for social welfare. If the defendant would
take optimal or even suboptimal precautions when he expects to pay D − Cp to the
victims of an accident, social welfare will surely fall when L(N) < D − Cp. Moreover,
this welfare loss is larger when the number of plaintiffs, N , rises.
The plaintiffs clearly have a joint incentive to overcome this problem of externalities.
There are several ways for the plaintiffs to accomplish this objective.
First, the plaintiffs might agree to make a single acceptance decision for all plaintiffs,
decided by a unanimous rule (after the defendant’s offers).9 Given such a commitment,
the plaintiff who received the smallest offer will be pivotal in making acceptance decision.
Under the unanimity rule, this plaintiff can send the entire class to trial by vetoing the
proposal, and doing so will give him a payoff of (D − Cp)/N . Plaintiffs will clearly
reject offers for less than this amount, and so the defendant can do no better than offer
(D − Cp)/N to each and every to every plaintiff.
9We consider ex post contracting by the plaintiffs, made only after the defendant makes offers to the
plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs can make ex ante commitment, they may be able to do better. They might
be able to commit themselves to only accept offers that are, in aggregate, higher than D + Cd. Such a
strategy would be susceptible to renegotiation, however.
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Second, the same outcome could be attained ex ante if the plaintiffs can commit not
to entertain discriminatory offers by the defendant. If such a commitment is credible,
then the defendant must make the same offer to every plaintiff. Whenever the uniform
offer is strictly less than (D−Cp)/N , it is a coalition-proof Nash response by the plaintiffs
to reject the offer (individually), and realize the aggregate payoff of D−Cp jointly from
trial.10 Hence, the defendant will offer (D − Cp)/N to every plaintiff, just as in the
benchmark. Plaintiffs may achieve such a commitment with the help of a policy or
court regulation prohibiting discriminatory offers. Indeed, in class action suits, courts
often intervene settlement processes, in large part to protect the interest of the minority
plaintiffs. Such a protection of minority interests may very well serve to limit the ability
by the defendant to exploit the plaintiffs via its divide and conquer strategy. To the
extent that such a regulation restores socially desirable deterrence (or, as in Section 4,
a reduction in the incidence of costly trials), the current paper provides a rationale for
the courts’ regulation of settlement procedures.
Finally, the plaintiffs may overcome the externalities problem by exchanging side
payments after receiving the offers from the defendant. As is well-known from the Coase
theorem, unexplored externalities on the part of the plaintiffs can be realized through
negotiation among them. For instance, the plaintiffs who expect to be harmed by settling
plaintiffs can bribe the latter not to settle, thus realizing the scale economies of litigation,
whenever it is jointly beneficial. Again the ability to exchange side transfers can be
achieved within the organizational framework such as class actions or other mechanisms
that permit or even encourage such a negotiation.
Proposition 4. The plaintiffs can induce an aggregate offer from the defendant of D−
Cp, (i) if they can commit to make a single acceptance decision via a unanimous rule, or
(ii) if they can commit not to accept discriminatory offers, or (iii) if they can exchange
side payments.
4 Extensions and Robustness of Results
We show here that the exploitation of the plaintiffs’ externalities is robust to a number
of extensions of our model.
4.1 Sequential Offers
Suppose that the defendant approaches plaintiffs in predetermined order, i = 1, ...N , and
makes a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it offers, S1, ...SN . Plaintiff i must either accept or
reject Si before the defendant moves on to plaintiff i+1, and the same process is repeated
10Although it may also be a Nash equilibrium for the plaintiffs to all accept lesser offers, acceptance
is Pareto dominated for the plaintiffs.
11
with the full knowledge on both sides about the prior history of bargaining. After the
last plaintiff, plaintiff N , has made his acceptance decision, all remaining plaintiffs decide
simultaneously and non-cooperatively, but again in a coalition-proof fashion, whether to
proceed to trial. We will restrict attention to the case where N > N∗, so m(N) > 1 and
no plaintiff could profit from going to trial alone.
We show in this case that the defendant can exploit the plaintiffs’ negative external-
ities to a point that no plaintiff can receives any positive payoff. This is indeed a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that satisfies the coalition-proof refinement. Sup-
pose that the defendant reaches the last plaintiff, and there have been n < N rejections
so far. If the last plaintiff rejects his or her settlement offer, then the coalition of plaintiff
N and the other n plaintiffs will go to trial if and only if n+ 1 ≥ m. Therefore plaintiff
N ’s outside option is max{0, x(N)− cp(n+ 1)}. If the defendant were to offer
Sˆn := max{0, x(N)− cp(n+ 1)}
then the plaintiff would be (just) willing to accept. The defendant is certainly better
off settling with plaintiff N on these terms, since he would otherwise pay x(N) to the
plaintiff at trial. (Since cd is fixed, there are no incremental costs of the additional
plaintiff.)
Working backwards, suppose the defendant reaches the kth plaintiff in the sequence.
Arguing inductively, assume that the defendant will settle with all subsequent plaintiffs.
Then, the same argument as above establishes that, if there have been j rejections up
to that point, the defendant will offer in that subgame Sˆj := max{0, x(N)− cp(j + 1)},
which is in turn accepted by the plaintiff. We therefore conclude that in a unique SPE
outcome has, in any subgame following j rejections, the defendant offer Sˆj and the
plaintiff accepts it.
Applying this outcome to the first round bargaining, the defendant offers Sˆ0 =
max{0, x(N)− cp(1)}, and this is accepted by the first plaintiff. By our earlier assump-
tion, x(N) − cp(1) < 0 so we have S0 = 0. The same behavior is repeated throughout.
That is, all plaintiffs receive zero payoffs. We have arrived at the following conclusion:
Proposition 5. Suppose m(N) > 1. If the defendant approaches the plaintiffs sequen-
tially, making take-it-or-leave-it settlement demands to each, then plaintiffs earn payoffs
of zero in equilibrium.
The externalities problem is clearly worse when m(N) > 1 and the defendant makes
sequential settlement offers. Interestingly, unlike the case of simultaneous offers, pro-
hibiting the defendant from making discriminatory offers does not solve the problem.
To see this, suppose the defendant faces two plaintiffs in sequence, and m(2) = 2, and
the defendant is required to offer to the second plaintiff the same amount as the one
accepted by the first plaintiff. Suppose the defendant begins with a zero settlement to
the first plaintiff. If this offer is accepted, then the second plaintiff has no case and will
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be willing to settle at zero, which is exactly when the defendant will offer, in compli-
ance with the regulation. If the first plaintiff refuses the zero offer, however, then the
regulation has no bite, and the defendant is free to raise her offer to (D − Cp)/2 to
the second plaintiff. This ability to raise the offer to a later plaintiff is precisely what
enables the defendant to exploit the plaintiffs’ externalities to such an extreme degree.
A typical non-discrimination clause (which has a binding effect only when earlier offers
are accepted) does not diminish that ability.
4.2 Plaintiff Bargaining Power
Suppose instead that the plaintiffs make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the
defendant. We continue to restrict attention to the case where N > N∗, so m(N) > 1
and no plaintiff could profit from going to trial alone. After receiving the set of offers,
the defendant decides which (if any) of the offers to accept and which to reject. The
plaintiffs are then informed of the defendant’s decision and the decide, simultaneously
and non-cooperatively, but in a coalition-proof fashion, whether to drop their claims or
proceed to trial.
Since a single plaintiff will not pursue litigation, it is easy to see that there is an
equilibrium where all the plaintiffs receive a zero payoff. Suppose that each plaintiff
demands settlement of 0, and the defendant accepts these offers. Clearly, no profitable
deviation exists. If a plaintiff unilaterally deviates and demands a strictly positive offer,
the defendant will simply reject that offer (and accept all other offers of zero), and the
deviating plaintiff, being the lone plaintiff with a rejected offer, is unable to mount a
viable litigation.
More surprisingly, we show that this equilibrium is unique in pure strategies, so it is
coalition proof (in pure strategies). This proof involves several steps.
First, we will show that there cannot be any trials on the equilibrium path. Suppose
to the contrary that a set I or plaintiffs with size |I| = k > 1 proceed to trial. It follows
that the settlement demands Si of each plaintiff in this coalition, i ∈ I, must have been
rejected by the defendant before trial. The defendant would have been weakly better off
settling with a single plaintiff in this group, i ∈ I, for an amount Si so long as Si ≤ Si
where
Si +
∑
j∈N\I
Sj + (k − 1)x(N) =
∑
j∈N\I
Sj + kx(N).
The left hand side of this expression represents the defendant’s payments if he settles
with plaintiff i (for Si) and the coalition N\I, but litigates against the remaining k − 1
plaintiffs. The right hand side represents the defendant’s payments if he settles with
the coalition N\I and litigates against the remaining k plaintiffs. Rearranging terms we
have
Si = x(N).
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The very least a single plaintiff i ∈ I would be willing to accept for settlement is
Si = x(N)− cp(k) < x(N).
The fact that Si < Si implies that a profitable deviation exists where a plaintiff can
unilaterally change his settlement demand to S ∈ (Si, Si) and induce the defendant to
accept. Since plaintiff i is and the defendant are strictly better from such a deviation,
the hypothesized behavior, and hence trial, can never occur on the equilibrium path.
Second, we will prove that there must be at least one plaintiff receives a zero payoff
in equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that all plaintiffs receive strictly positive payoffs
in equilibrium. Since no trials occur in equilibrium by our previous argument, it must
be the case that the defendant accepts strictly positive settlement demands from all
of the plaintiffs. Clearly, this cannot be an equilibrium. Rather than accepting all of
the settlement offers, the defendant could have done strictly better by rejecting at least
m−1 such offers. (Once their offers are rejected, the m−1 plaintiffs will rationally drop
their claims.)
Finally, we show that no plaintiff can earn a strictly positive payoff in equilibrium.
Suppose to the contrary that a plaintiff i earns strictly positive payoff. This is possible,
given no trial, only if that plaintiff’s settlement demand Si > 0 is accepted by the
defendant in equilibrium. By the previous claim, there also exists a plaintiff (call him
plaintiff j) who receives a zero payoff. Suppose that plaintiff j unilaterally deviated
and made a settlement demand just slightly below the demand of plaintiff i, Sj = Si− .
The defendant would receive a higher payoff by accepting Sj and rejecting Si. Hence,
there will be no plaintiff with zero payoff, which contradicts our earlier claim that there
must exist a plaintiff who receives a zero payoff.
We have arrived at the following conclusion:
Proposition 6. Suppose m(N) > 1. In any pure-strategy equilibrium of the game where
the plaintiffs make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it settlement demands to the defendant,
the plaintiffs earn payoffs of zero.
4.3 Asymmetric Information
We now extend our previous analysis to include asymmetric information. Doing so
allows us to investigate the robustness of our results as well as the equilibrium bargaining
behavior in the presence of asymmetric information; but more importantly, asymmetric
information introduces positive probability of trial on the equilibrium path, so it gives
us an opportunity to study how the bargaining externalities affect the settlement/trial
rate. Rather than considering a general number of plaintiffs, we focus on the case where
N = 2. In this extension, the plaintiffs are privately informed about their (expected)
damage levels. We will see that the equilibrium is similar in many ways to the one
that would arise with complete information. First, the defendant adopts a divide and
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conquer strategy, offering more to one plaintiff than to the other. Second, the plaintiffs
are worse off in this equilibrium than they would be if they consolidated their claims or
could exchange side payments with each other. Last but not the least, it will be seen
that the inability to internalize litigation externalities leads to reduced incidence of trial.
Suppose that two plaintiffs are facing a defendant. Each plaintiff has expected dam-
ages x distributed (independently) over {xL, xH} with probabilities 1−λ and λ, respec-
tively, where xH > xL > 0. Further, we assume that
Cp
2
< xL < xH < Cp.
That is, a lawsuit is profitable jointly but not so by oneself, regardless of the types.
This model introduces an interaction between litigation externalities and endogenous
settlement in a simple fashion.
The defendant makes a pair of offers (S1, S2) simultaneously, followed by the plaintiffs
deciding whether to accept and reject those offers. The plaintiffs’ decisions are made in
a Pareto efficient fashion; namely, the equilibrium decisions made on any pair (S1, S2)
must be such that there is no other decisions on their part that will strictly Pareto
dominate the decisions. This ability to make a Pareto undominated decision does not
mean that the two plaintiffs will behave like a single decision maker. The source of
transaction cost or imperfect coordination here is two fold: First, the plaintiffs cannot
use transfers to overcome the externalities problem, just as in the previous setting.
Second, the plaintiffs do not observe each other’s types, which could lead to a less than
perfect coordination between two plaintiffs. To appreciate how the externalities affect
the settlement decisions and outcomes, it is useful to begin with a benchmark in which
the two plaintiffs are able to perfectly coordinate their behavior, with the ability to
exchange transfers and to observe each other’s type.
4.3.1 Benchmark: Perfect Coordination
Suppose the defendant has offered (S1, S2). The plaintiffs decide whether to accept the
offers in a way that maximize their joint payoffs, possibly making side payments to each
other. It is then clear then that the plaintiffs will never accept only one offer. They
will either accept both offers or neither offer. There are three possible strategies for the
defendant:
First, the defendant may choose to induce the plaintiff coalition to accept if and only
if they have both low damages. The necessary aggregate offer is SLL = 2xL − Cp. In
this case, the defendant’s expected loss is
LLL := (1− λ)2[2xL − Cp] + 2λ(1− λ)[xL + xH + Cd] + λ2[2xH + Cd].
Second, the defendant may choose to induce the coalition to accept if and only if
they have one low and one high damages, or they both have low damages. The necessary
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total offer is SLH = xL + xH − Cp. In this case, the defendant’s expected loss is
LLH := (1− λ2)[xL + xH − Cp] + λ2[2xH + Cd].
Third, the defendant may choose to induce settlement with certainty by offering
SHH = 2xH − Cp in total. Obviously, the defendant’s expected loss in this case is
LHH := 2xH − Cp.
There are two threshold values,
λˆ1 :=
xH − xL
xH − xL + 2(Cp + cd) , λˆ2 :=
√
xH − xL
xH − xL + Cp + Cd
such that the first strategy is optimal if λ < λˆ1, the second is optimal if λ ∈ [λˆ1, λˆ2] and
the third is optimal if λ ≥ λˆ2. The trial probability is then
τ ∗(λ) :=

1− (1− λ)2 if λ ≤ λˆ1,
λ2 if λ ∈ [λˆ1, λˆ2],
0 if λ ≥ λˆ2.
4.3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Suppose now the plaintiffs now make Pareto undominated acceptance decisions in re-
sponse to any pair of offers (S1, S2) that the defendant may make. The equilibrium may
involve the defendant adopting one of the following divide and conquer strategies.
Strategy L: The defendant induces only one plaintiff to accept her offer only
when he has low damages.
Suppose plaintiff 1 is induced to accept when x = xL. Minimal offers that accomplish
this outcome is (S1, S2) = (xL−Cp/2, 0). Since plaintiff 2 rejects his offer, any lower offer
to plaintiff 1 will be rejected even when he has low damages. The defendant’s expected
loss is then
L˜L(λ) := (1− λ)(xL − Cp
2
) + λ [(1− λ)(xL + xH + Cd) + λ(2xH + Cd)] .
Strategy LL: The defendant induces each plaintiff to accept her offer only when
he has low damages.
Minimal offers that accomplish this outcome is (S1, S2) = (xL−Cp/2, λ(xL−Cp/2)).
Even though only a low type plaintiff is induced to accept, given the externalities, the
lawsuit arises only when both plaintiffs have high types. A high damage plaintiff who
rejects his offer is unable to litigate when the other plaintiff settles. In other words,
16
the defendant accomplishes the same outcome as she would have in the benchmark
by offering SLH in total settlement. Observe that a strictly smaller amount S1 + S2 =
(1+λ)(xL−Cp/2) < SLH is needed to accomplish the same outcome due to the plaintiffs’
inability to coordinate their behavior. The defendant’s expected loss is then
L˜LL(λ) := (1− λ2)(xL − Cp
2
) + λ2(2xH + Cd).
Notice that, with these offers, the defendant faces a lawsuit only when both plaintiffs
have high damages.
Strategy H: The defendant induces only one plaintiff to accept her offer, regard-
less of his type.
Assume without loss that plaintiff 1 is induced to accept the offer. Minimal offers
that accomplish this outcome is (S1, S2) = (xH − Cp/2, 0). By offering xH − Cp/2 in
total, the defendant can avoid any trial. Recall that twice this amount, SHH = 2xH−Cp,
was needed to achieve the same outcome if the plaintiffs were able to coordinate their
decisions. The defendant’s expected loss is then
L˜H := xH − Cp
2
.
Notice that the defendant faces no lawsuit from plaintiff 2, now that plaintiff 1 settles
always. In fact, plaintiff 2 may as well accept the zero settlement. Strategy H also
employs divide and conquer tactics.
There is no other strategy that the defendant may use. For instance, the strategy of
inducing settlement from one plaintiff always and from the other only when he has low
type is the same as Strategy H.
In fact, strategy L is dominated by strategy LL, for
L˜L(λ)−L˜LL(λ) = −(1−λ)λ(xL−Cp
2
)+λ(1−λ)(xL+xH+Cd) = λ(1−λ)(xH+Cd+Cp
2
) > 0.
Consequently, we can simply focus on the comparison between strategy LL and
strategy H. It follows that there exists
λ˜ :=
√
xH − xL
2xH − xL + Cp2 + Cd
∈ (0, 1
2
).
such that the defendant adopts Strategy LL if λ ≤ λ˜ and Strategy H if λ ≥ λ˜. Trial
occurs with probability
τ(λ) :=
{
λ2 if λ ≤ λ˜,
0 if λ ≥ λ˜.
It is instructive to compare the equilibrium outcome in terms of the probability trial
as well as of the defendant’s payment:
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Proposition 7. When the plaintiffs are privately informed about their damages, the
defendant adopts a divide and conquer strategy. Trial occurs with a lower probability
in equilibrium than in the full-coordination benchmark (more precisely, τ(λ) ≤ τ ∗(λ),
with strict inequality for a positive measure of λ). The defendant’s payment is lower in
equilibrium than in the benchmark.
Proof: We first observe that
λ˜ =
√
xH − xL
2xH − xL + Cp2 + Cd
=
√
xH − xL
xH − xL + (xH − Cp2 ) + Cp + Cd
<
√
xH − xL
xH − xL + Cp + Cd
= λˆ2.
Hence, for λ ∈ (λ˜, λˆ2), τ(λ) = 0 < τ ∗(λ) = λ2. Now consider any λ ≤ min{λ˜, λˆ1}. In
this case, τ(λ) = λ2 < 1− (1− λ)2 = τ ∗(λ). In all other values of λ, τ(λ) = τ ∗(λ). This
proves the first statement. The last statement follows from the fact that
min{L˜LL, L˜H} < min{LLL, LLH , LHH}.
It is not difficult to see why trial is less likely to occur when there are litigation
externalities. A plaintiff fails to internalize the cost he imposed on the other plaintiff
when settling with the defendant. Consequently, either plaintiffs settle too easily or they
fail to coordinate on their litigation, leaving a plaintiff stranded unable to litigate against
the defendant after rejecting her offer.11 As before, the defendant is a clear beneficiary
of this inability of the plaintiffs to internalize the externalities, which she exploits by
the “divide and conquer” strategy, even in the presence of asymmetric information. The
reduced payment by the defendant again implies her reduced incentive to take care.
At the same time, the reduced likelihood of trial is socially desirable because of the
reduced litigation expenditures. Hence, unlike the case of symmetric information, the
exploitation of plaintiffs has a welfare benefit which must be weighed against the loss
from weakened deterrence (if such a loss exists).
11Interestingly, the plaintiffs in our problem need not settle with probability 1− τ(λ). For instance,
when the defendant employs strategy LL, then a high type plaintiffs rejects the defendant’s offer in
equilibrium, but fails to proceed to litigate the defendant if the other plaintiff happens to be a low type.
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5 Conclusion
This paper looked at a simple bargaining model with a single defendant and N plaintiffs
when there are fixed costs of litigation that will be spread among the plaintiffs who go
to trial. Externalities naturally arise in this setting because the decision of one plaintiff
to settle with the defendant out of court dilutes the value of the remaining plaintiffs’
claims. We showed that these externalities put the plaintiffs in a unusually vulnerable
position when bargaining with the defendant.
We started with the case where the defendant makes simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it
offers to the plaintiffs. The defendant adopted divide and conquer strategies in this
case, offering more to some plaintiffs than to others. Importantly, the defendant easily
exploited the plaintiffs through these strategies, coercing them into settling their claims
for less than they were jointly worth at trial. Moreover, we showed that the plaintiffs were
worse off when the number of plaintiffs is larger and when the defendant’s settlement
offers are sequential instead of simultaneous. Somewhat surprisingly, the plaintiffs are
be worse off still when they had the power to make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers
to the defendant.
The analysis presented here has both positive and normative implications. On the
positive side, the analysis implies that the plaintiffs have a motive to write contracts
with each other and coordinate their strategies to improve their joint payoffs. This may
be accomplished through simple transfer payments among the plaintiffs, through explicit
voting rules, and through covenants not to accept discriminatory offers. On the nor-
mative side, the fact that the settlement externalities favor the defendant implies that
the defendant’s incentives to take precautions at an ex ante stage are weakened. This
could, of course, be bad for society overall. Our analysis also highlights potential social
benefits stemming from divide and conquer strategies. In the presence of asymmetric
information, we showed that the settlement rate was higher and overall litigation spend-
ing correspondingly lower than would be the case if the plaintiffs were able coordinate
their strategies. This social benefit would counterbalance, to a greater or lesser extent,
the potential social losses due to reduced deterrence.
19
References
[1] Bar-Gill, O. and Ben-Shahar, O. [2007], “The Prisoners (Plea Bargain)
Dilemma,” New York University School of Law, New York University Law and
Economics Working Papers, Paper 97.
[2] Bebchuk, L. A. and Guzman, A. [1996], “How Would You Like To Pay For
That? The Strategic Effects of Fee Arrangements on Settlement Terms,” Harvard
Negotiation Law Review, 1, 53-63.
[3] Bernheim, B. D., Peleg, B., and M. D. Whinston [1987], “Coalition-Proof
Nash Equilibria 1. Concepts,” Journal of Economic Theory, 42, 1-12.
[4] Caillaud, B. and B. Jullien [2003], “Chicken and Egg: Competition among
Intermediation Service Providers”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 24, 521-552.
[5] Chang, H.F. and Sigman, H. [2000], “Incentives to Settle Under Joint and
Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation,” Journal of Legal
Studies, 24, 205-236.
[6] Che, Y.-K. [1996], “Equilibrium Formation of Class Action Suits,” Journal of
Public Economics, 62, 339-361.
[7] Che, Y.-K. [2002], “The Economics of Collective Negotiations in Pretrial Bargain-
ing,” The International Economic Review, 43, 549-576.
[8] Che, Y.-K. and Yi, J.G. [1993], “The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation,”
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 9, 399-424.
[9] Choi, A. [2003], “Allocating Settlement Authority Under a Contingent-Fee Ar-
rangement,” The Journal of Legal Studies, 32, 585-610.
[10] Cooter, R. D. and Rubinfeld, D. L. [1989], “Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution,” Journal of Economic Literature, 27, 1067-1097.
[11] Daughety, A.F. (2000) “Settlement,” In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, B.
Bouckaert and G. De Geest, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing Co. 5, 95–158.
[12] Daughety, A. F. and Reinganum, J. F. [1999] “Hush Money’, RAND Journal
of Economics, 30, 661-678.
[13] Daughety, A. F. and Reinganum, J. F. [2002] “Information Externalities in
Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability,” RAND Journal
of Economics, 33, 587-604.
20
[14] Daughety, A. F. and Reinganum, J. F. [2004], “Exploiting Future Settle-
ments: A Signaling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargain-
ing,” RAND Journal of Economics, 35, 467-485.
[15] Daughety, A. F. and Reinganum, J. F. [2005], “Economic Theories of Settle-
ment Bargaining,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 1, 35-59.
[16] Grossman, S. and O. Hart [1988], “One Share - One Vote and the Market for
Corporate Control,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 175-202.
[17] Hay, B. and Spier, K. E. [1998], “Settlement of Litigation,” In Peter Newman,
ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan Reference
Limited, 3, 442-451.
[18] Hua, X. and Spier, K. E. [2005], “Information and Externalities in Sequential
Litigation,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161, 215-32.
[19] Innes, R. and R. J. Sexton [1994], “Strategic Buyers and Exclusionary Con-
tracts,” American Economic Review, 84, 566-584.
[20] Klerman, D. [1996], “Settling Multidefendant Lawsuits: The Advantage of Con-
ditional Setoff Rules,” Journal of Legal Studies, 25, 445-461.
[21] Kornhauser, L. A. and Revesz, R. L. [1994a], “Multidefendant Settlements:
The Impact of Joint and Several Liability,” Journal of Legal Studies, 23, 41-76.
[22] Kornhauser, L. A. and Revesz, R. L. [1994b], “Multidefendant Settlements
under Joint and Several Liability: The Problem of Insolvency,” Journal of Legal
Studies, 23, 517-542.
[23] Meurer, M. [1992], “The Gains From Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: Settlement
Conflict Between Defendants and Liability Insurers,” Journal of Law, Economics
and Organization, 8, 502-522.
[24] Miller, G. P. [1998], “Class Actions,” In Peter Newman, ed., The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan Reference Limited, 1, 257-262.
[25] Polinsky, A. M. and Rubinfeld, D. L. [1988], “The Deterrent Effects of Set-
tlements and Trials,” International Review of Law and Economics, 8, 109-116.
[26] Rasmusen, E. B., Rasmeyer, J. M. and J. S. Wiley Jr., [1991], “Naked
Exclusion,” American Economic Review, 81, 1137-1144.
[27] Reinganum, J. F. [forthcoming], “Comments on ’Exploiting Plaintiffs Through
Settlement: Divide and Conquer’,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Eco-
nomics.
21
[28] Segal, I. [1999], “Contracting with Externalities,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 114, 337-388.
[29] Segal, I. [2003], “Coordination and Discrimination in Contracting with Exter-
nalities: Divide and Conquer,” Journal of Economic Theory, 113, 147-181.
[30] Segal, I. and M. Whinston, [2000], “Naked Exclusion: Comment,” American
Economic Review, 90, 296-309.
[31] Segal, I. and M. Whinston, [2003], “Robust Predictions for Bilateral Con-
tracting with Externalities,” Econometrica, 71, 757-791.
[32] Shavell, S. [1997], “The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the
Social Motive to Use the Legal System,” Journal of Legal Studies, 26, 575-613.
[33] Spier, K. E. [1994], “A Note on Joint and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settle-
ment, and Incentives,” Journal of Legal Studies, 23, 559-68.
[34] Spier, K. E. [2002], “Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role of Insolvency,”
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18, 295-323.
[35] Spier, K. E. [2003a], “The Use of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement of
Litigation,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 34, 78-95.
[36] Spier, K. E. [2003b], “Tied To the Mast: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settle-
ment Contracts,” Journal of Legal Studies, 32, 91-120.
[37] Spier, K. E. [2005], “Economics of Litigation,” in L. E. Blume and S. N. Durlauf,
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed., Palgrave McMillan.
[38] Spier, K. E. [2007], “Litigation,” in The Handbook of Law and Economics,
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds., North Holland, 265-345.
[39] Spier, K. E. and Sykes, A. O. [1998], “Capital Structure, Priority Rules, and
the Settlement of Civil Claims,” The International Review of Law and Economics,
18, 187-200.
[40] Stremitzer, A. [forthcoming], “Comments on ’Exploiting Plaintiffs Through
Settlement: Divide and Conquer’,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Eco-
nomics.
[41] Sykes, A. O. [1994], “‘Bad Faith’ Refusal to Settle by Liability Insurers: Some
Implications of the Judgment-Proof Problem,” Journal of Legal Studies, 23, 77-110.
22
Yeon-Koo Che
Economics Department
Columbia University
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
E-mail: yc2271@columbia.edu
Kathryn E. Spier
Harvard Law School
1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
E-mail: kspier@law.harvard.edu
23
